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#News(General) [ via IoTGroup ]
Instead they have doubled down on a flawed and outdated cybersecurity model to convince themselves that they can manage the risk that Chinese intelligence services could use Huawei’s access to UK telco networks to insert bad code.
Having been caught off guard by BT’s decision to use Huawei equipment in the core of its network, in 2010 the UK government set up a Huawei-funded cybersecurity transparency centre ‘to mitigate any perceived risks arising from the involvement of Huawei in parts of the UK’s critical national infrastructure’ by evaluating Huawei products used in the UK telecommunications market.
I was part of the team in the Australian Signals Directorate that tried to design a suite of cybersecurity controls that would give the government confidence that hostile intelligence services could not leverage their national vendors to gain access to our 5G networks.
We asked ourselves, if we had the powers akin to the 2017 Chinese Intelligence Law to direct a company which supplies 5G equipment to telco networks, what could we do with that and could anyone stop us?
Telcos currently protect the core of their 4G networks by maintaining a physical and logical separation between the core and the less secure, customer-facing edge of the network.
An Oxford Economics report commissioned by Huawei last year claims that excluding the company from bidding for our 5G networks will cost Australia up to $12 billion in GDP out to 2035.
Read More..
AutoTextExtraction by Working BoT using SmartNews 1.02976805238 Build 26 Aug 2019
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